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POLICE AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS IN DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Economic theory predicts that a rise in police presence will reduce criminal activity. However 
several studies in the literature have found mixed results. This study adds to the literature by 
exploring the relationship between the size of police and crime against firms, an important issue 
especially for developing economies. Using data for about 12,000 firms in 27 developing 
countries we find that increasing the police force has a negative effect on crime against firms. 
We also find that several macro-economic factors can weaken or strengthen this negative effect. 
The results are robust to various sensitivity checks. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Economic theory predicts that a rising police presence will reduce criminal activity (Becker, 
1968). There are essentially two channels through which this takes place – deterrence and 
incapacitation. According to the former, greater police presence deters potential criminal activity, 
and with regards to the latter, more police presence incarcerates more criminals and thus reduces 
the pool of criminals in the streets. However, the theoretical underpinning of the crime – police 
relationship has received mixed empirical validation. For example, Cameron (1988) finds that 18 
out of 22 papers surveyed researchers found either a positive effect of police presence on crime 
or no relationship between these variables. Fajnzylber et al (2002) find that police presence has a 
negative effect of on violent crime but a positive and significant effect on property crime.  
 
The mixed empirical evidence has been explained by two reasons. Theoretically the effect of 
police presence on crime through deterrence or incapacitation has received some criticism. 
Typically police are not involved directly with crime reduction, and there is evidence that even 
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the most routine policing strategies fail to deter potential offenders (Kovandzic and Sloan, 2002).  
Furthermore burglars are found to be rational when engaging in criminal activities, and their 
choices range from type of crime to commit, frequency, when and how to commit the crime 
(Kovandzic and Sloan, 2002; Wright and Decker, 1994). The implication is that increasing police 
presence may actually result in more crime as criminals change from serious (and possibly 
lucrative) crimes to undertaking less serious crimes more frequently.   
 
Empirically, the positive association between police presence and crime has been blamed on 
flawed methodology or inadequate consideration of endogeneity issues and omitted variable 
biases (Marvell and Moody, 1996). A few recent studies have accounted for this problem and 
found a negative relationship. Levitt (2004) uses instruments for police presence via 
expenditures allocated to fire fighters and finds a negative relationship between police presence 
and crime.  Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) isolate the causal effects of police on crime by 
examining the impact of an exogenous increase in police presence due to terrorism attacks in 
Buenos Aires in Argentina and find a negative relationship between police presence and crime. 
 
A natural extension of the literature would be to explore whether the relationship between police 
and crime for households or in general overall crime rates in the economy also applies 
specifically to crimes against firms, since overall crime rate results do not give any indication of 
how the results apply only to firms. The contribution of this paper is that it specifically examines 
the relationship between police presence and crime against firms in developing economies. 
Using firm level survey data, losses due to crime as a percentage of sales is used to measure the 
burden of crime. The use of firm surveys is not plagued with the issue of under-reporting 
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associated with using police reports to measures of crime. The effect of police on crime against 
firms may have a range of possible outcomes. A greater police presence may have a stronger 
deterrence effect on crime against firms than individual crime as criminals are more likely to 
substitute away from crime against firms, where security measures may be greater, to less serious 
criminal activities that face less cost. However, most firms may have the capacity to utilize 
private security measures to deter criminal activity. Consequently, the presence of a police force 
may reflect the existence of criminal activity, but have no correlation with crime against firms. 
Thus, which mechanism dominates is an empirical question. 
 
The private sector is a key engine of growth in developing economies. Thus, if businesses 
experience high levels of criminal activities, the detrimental effect on the economy could be 
significant. Yet crime against firms has been under-researched in the literature. Hopkins (2002) 
finds that in Britain about 24% of retailers and manufacturers were burgled in 1993 in contrast to 
5.6% of households implying a higher rate of victimization for firms.  Large firms experience 
more crime than small firms, although small firms face a larger burden of crime in a sample of 
Latin American countries (Amin, 2009). Also firms owned by immigrants are more vulnerable to 
crime than native owned firms (Amin, 2010).  
 
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, we quantify the effect of police presence on the 
burden of crime experienced by firms. Second, we explore this relationship further by examining 
how several socio-economic and firm characteristics weaken or accentuate the relationship 
between crime against firms and police presence. 
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In order to examine the relationship between police and crime, we use a unique firm level dataset 
with about 12,000 firms in 27 developing countries maintained by the World Bank’s Enterprise 
Analysis unit (Enterprise Surveys). We find that an increase in police per 100,000 of population 
by 1 standard deviation results in a 0.029 standard deviation reduction in the losses due to crime. 
We find that high inequality, high voter turnout, larger cities, and female ownership and 
management strengthen the negative relationship between police and losses due to crime. On the 
other hand faster economic growth, good governance, and greater religious fractionalization 
mitigate the relationship between police and losses due to crime. We use a dummy indicating 
whether the party of the chief executive is right-wing and the stock of international migrants as a 
% of the population as instruments and find that the results are retained, if not magnified. The 
results are also robust to various sensitivity checks. 
 
Section 2 describes the data, section 3 provides the estimation and results, and sections 4, 5, and 
6 provide instrumental variable estimations, robustness checks, and conclusions respectively. 
 
2 Data and Main Variables 
The data for firm level variables are collected by the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys. The 
Enterprise Surveys use standard survey instruments to collect firm-level data on a country's 
business environment from business owners and top managers. The surveys cover a broad range 
of topics including access to finance, corruption, infrastructure, crime, competition, labor, 
obstacles to growth and performance measures. The survey is designed to be representative of a 
country’s private non-agricultural economy and only registered firms with at least five 
employees are included in the sample. The data consists of a random sample of 12,000 firms 
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across 27 developing countries in different regions stratified by firm size, location, and sector.  
The survey year ranges between 2007 and 2009. Details of countries in the sample and their 
respective survey years can be found in the first column of table A3 in the appendix. 
 
2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable utilized is losses due to crime as a percentage of annual sales. This 
variable is derived from the survey question: “In fiscal year [insert fiscal year], what are the 
estimated losses as a result of theft, robbery, vandalism or arson that occurred on establishment’s 
premises calculated as a percent of annual sales or the total annual value of the losses?” 
For total values of crime, the percentage over sales is calculated. Crime losses as a % of sale 
capture the intensity of crime. We make no distinction between a firm that has experienced no 
crime and a firm that has experienced crime but incurred no losses. Both firms get a zero value 
for the dependent variable. The variable averages 0.72% in the sample with a standard deviation 
of 3.9%.  Using country averages across all firms, Azerbaijan has the lowest amount of crime 
losses at 0.20% of sales, while El Salvador has the highest with 1.73%. Data source and 
description of the variable can be found in table A1, with summary statistics in table A2. 
 
2.2 Explanatory variable  
The main variable of interest is the number of police per 100,000 of population. The variable is 
obtained from United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems. The variable is typically lagged by 1 year, however due to data constraints, for some 
countries the lag is not exactly one year previous, but a few years before in certain cases. The 
specific details of the number of lags are available in table A3 in the appendix. The sample mean 
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for the number of police is 288, while the standard deviation is 108. Macedonia has the highest 
number of police with 480 police per 100,000 of the population while Hungary has the lowest 
with 90 police per 100,000 of population. The country average crime losses and number of 
police are presented in table A4 for each country in the appendix.  
 
2. 3 Other explanatory variables 
We control for several firm level and country level variables. The degree of crime a firm faces 
may depend on its size, the sector it belongs to, and its locale. We control for firm size using 
dummies for small and medium firms. A small firm is defined as a firm with less than 20 
employees, while a medium firm has workers between 20 and 99. We also have a dummy for 
manufacturing firms. A priori it is not clear whether a manufacturing firm should have higher 
crime losses with respect to other sectors. We also include a city size dummy which takes the 
value of 1 if the city has a population of 250,000 of greater, or is a capital city, and 0 otherwise. 
We also include a dummy for whether a firm has at least one female owner. All these variables 
are from the Enterprise Survey’s data set. 
 
At the country level, we control for Real GDP per Capita growth, Real GNI per capita, and the 
Gini index, given their prominence in the literature. For cases where data for the exact date is 
unavailable, we use data for the closest date available. The exact year of data used for GNI per 
capita and the Gini index are presented in table A3 in the appendix. We also control for country 
size using the total population of the country. These data are available from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators.  Data source and description of the variable can be found in table 
A1, with summary statistics in table A2. 
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3 Estimation 
 
We estimate following equation using OLS. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 ij 10
(1)    
                         LargeCity
ij j j ij j j j ij ij
ij ij
crimeloss Policelag GDPgr Fem GNIcap GINI Population Small Medium
Manf
β β β β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + + + +
+ + +
 
Where cr is the losses due to crime as a % of sales, is the lagged number of 
police per 100,000 population,GD is the real GDP per capita growth, is a dummy 
representing female ownership, is the real GNI per capita, is the gini coefficient, 
is the total population of the economy,  and 
imeloss
tion
Policelag
GI
Pgr
GNIcap
Fem
NI
Popula Small Medium are firm size dummies, 
is a dummy for cities with population of 250,000 and greater, or capital cities, and 
finally 
LargeCity
Manf is a dummy for manufacturing firms.  
 
All estimates are based on standard errors clustered at the country level. In the later sections we 
add additional variables and interact them with the variable of interest to elucidate several 
relationships. The usual econometric issues of endogeneity and omitted variable bias are of a 
concern in the estimation. We limit the problem of reverse causality by using the lags of the 
number of police. However, under reverse causality we expect a positive correlation between 
crime and the number of police and thus any negative relationship we uncover would be even 
stronger if reverse causality was explicitly accounted for.  On the other hand omitted variable 
bias is an issue that is challenging to overcome given data limitations. We address this by using 
various checks as presented in the robustness section. 
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3.1 Base Regression Results 
All magnitudes discussed in the text are presented in standard deviation units, unless indicated. 
The figures shown in the tables are in nominal units, not standard deviation units. Since the 
dependent variable is a ratio of losses due to crime over sales, any reference to a reduction in 
crime refers to a reduction in losses due to crime as a share of sales. The base estimation results 
are presented in column 1 of table 1. The coefficient of the number of police is negative and 
significant at 5%. In terms of magnitude, a one standard deviation increase in the number of 
police results in a 0.029 standard deviation decline in crime losses. This result indicates that the 
number of police may effectively be a deterrent for crime against firms, just as studies have 
shown them to be a deterrent for individual level crime (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2004; 
Levitt, 1997). However, when all controls are excluded from the estimation, a negative 
relationship between police size and crime persists, but it is not significant unless GNI per capita 
is controlled for. Thus these results are conditional on the level of income in the country. 
 
A few other results stand out. Both real GDP per capita growth and Real GNI per capita have a 
negative and highly significant effect1. Although the negative effect of GDP per capita growth is 
not surprising considering individual level crime literature (Fajnzylber et al., 2002; Soares, 
2004), the negative effect of GNI per capita crime has been less robust in the literature (Soares, 
2004).Thus development may not be criminogenic at the firm level. The Gini coefficient and 
dummy for large or capital city are not significant despite their well documented effect on 
individual level crime (Dutta, 2009; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). The size of the country in 
                                                 
1 Due to the lack of continuous data for GNI per capita for some countries, we use the GDP growth rate instead of 
the GNI growth rate. This is typical in the literature (Fajnzylber et al, 2002). 
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terms of population has a positive coefficient implying that firms in larger countries have larger 
losses due to crime as a percentage of sales. 
 
Certain firm characteristics are found to be significant determinants of the losses due to crime. 
Having a female owner and manager or being a small or medium firm is likely to increase the 
losses suffered due to crime. This also implies that large firms experience fewer losses due to 
crime, perhaps due to safety measures they are able to implement. Manufacturing firms are less 
likely to sustain heavy losses due to crime than non-manufacturing firms. 
 
We now consider how several country and firm-level factors may influence the effectiveness of 
increasing police. Studies have indicated that the effectiveness of increasing the police force may 
depend on several variables such as the incentives for corruption such as governance and 
development or the distribution of income (Bourguignon, 1999).  We also wish to explore how 
large cities affect the effectiveness of the police force, or whether female owned firms are less 
correlated with crime in the presence of police. Finally, the extent of social disorganization may 
render a police expansion ineffective.  Thus we examine the strength of the relationship between 
police expansion and crime and how this relationship depends on factors such as inequality, city 
size, economic growth, female ownership and management, governance, voter turnouts in 
elections, and fractionalization.   
 
3.2 Economic Growth  
The interaction term between number of police force and economic growth is positive and 
significant at 5%. The total effect of police on crime losses is still negative at the mean level of 
10 
 
real GDP per capita growth when interacting number of police with GDP per capita growth as 
indicated in column 2 of table 1. However, looking at the extremes of the sample, Police per 
100,000 of population has no overall effect on fast growing countries. The effect of police on 
crime losses triples in magnitude at the minimum level of GDP per capita growth. The figures 
are presented in the bottom of column 2 of table 1. The results indicate that increasing the police 
force by one standard deviation at the mean GDP per capita growth results in a 0.033 standard 
deviation reduction in the dependent variable. Using the minimum values in the sample of GDP 
per capita growth, the overall effect of police increases from 0.033 to a 0.103 standard deviation 
reduction in crime losses. The growth rate turning point, after which the effect of police on crime 
losses is insignificant, in the sample is 3.7%, which is around the 66th percentile of the sample. 
These results seem to indicate that growth is a substitute for the police force. Perhaps fast 
growing countries may have the institutions in place, such as an effective judicial system, which 
deters criminal activity and thus reduces the requirement of a police force.  
 
3.3 Inequality and City Size 
There is substantial literature linking inequality to crime (Ehrlich, 1973; Fajnzylber et al., 2002) 
and city size to crime (Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999). This literature finds a positive relationship 
between inequality and crime, and city size and crime. The former is because high inequality can 
lower opportunity cost of crime for the most disfavored citizen and also increase the returns to 
crime, as measured by the income of potential victims. The latter is due to lower probabilities of 
arrest and recognition in bigger cities than smaller ones.  
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The interaction of inequality and police is negative and significant at 5%. At the mean level of 
inequality in the sample, the number of police has a negative and significant effect on the 
dependent variable when interacting police with the Gini coefficient. In comparison, this 
relationship becomes more significant at higher levels of inequality, but ceases to be significant  
at all conventional levels of statistical significance at the lower levels of inequality. As indicated 
in the bottom column 3 of table 1, a one standard deviation increase in the police force reduces 
crime losses by 0.033 standard deviations using the mean level of Gini in the sample. This figure 
increases to 0.088 with a significance of 1% for the highest level of Gini in the sample.  Above a 
Gini value of 37, which is the Gini value for Lithuania and the 42nd percentile value of the 
sample, the effectiveness of police becomes insignificant at all conventional levels. There are a 
couple of possible explanations for this. A highly unequal society may imply that the police force 
is responsive to the elite’s call for security especially when it comes to crime against firms. Such 
high responsiveness can be due to the fact that the elite class is politically powerful. Thus a 
higher level of police assists business owners in clamping down crime. Another possibility is that 
in highly unequal societies, the elite class is more likely to use resources in implementing private 
security. In this scenario, the alternative explanation would be that the level of police is directly 
correlated with losses due to crime for the non-elite classes of the society, since the elite already 
utilize private security. It is unclear the exact explanation for this result, which may merit further 
research. 
 
The interaction between the number of police and city size is negative and significant at 1%. 
That is, increasing the police force is more effective for larger or capital cities than smaller cities 
as indicated in column 4 of table 1. A one standard deviation increase in the police force in larger 
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cities results in a 0.049 standard deviation reduction in the dependent variable, significant at 1%. 
In contrast, the effect of increasing police by one standard deviation in small cities is 
insignificant. One possible reason could be that small cities have strong community networks, 
making it difficult to commit crime against firms. Thus increasing the police force is redundant. 
In contrast large cities have weaker community ties, and thus the anonymity makes crime more 
feasible, therefore increasing the effectiveness of increasing the police force. 
 
3.4Female Ownership & Management 
The interaction between firms that have a female owner and manager, and the number of police 
is negative and significant at 1%. Police effectiveness increases if the firm is owned and 
managed by a female as shown in column 1 of table 2. Increasing the police force by one 
standard deviation decreases crime losses by 0.097 standard deviations. The effect of police on 
crime losses for firms that don’t have a female owner and manager is insignificant with a 1 
standard deviation increase in the police force resulting in a 0.021 standard deviation reduction 
in the dependent variable. If female owners and managers are more likely to be targets of 
criminal activity, one interpretation is that an increase in the police force appears to be more 
effective in assisting the more vulnerable or less well off in society.  
 
3.5 Governance 
We use ICRG’s Quality of government as a governance indicator, with higher values of the 
variable indicating better governance.  A priori it is expected that the higher the quality of 
governance, which may imply less corruption and bureaucracy, the more effective a police 
expansion will be in reducing crime losses. However, our results show the opposite. The 
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interaction term between the number of police and the quality of government is positive and 
significant at 10%. At the mean value of the governance indicator, the effect of police is negative 
and significant at 1%. This result is magnified at the minimum level of governance, but loses 
significance at the maximum level. The magnitudes are presented at the bottom of column 2 in 
table 2.  The results indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the police force results in a 
0.043 standard deviation reduction in crime losses at the mean level of the Quality of 
Governance index. This figure doubles to 0.080 at the minimum level of governance, significant 
at 1%.  These results seem to indicate that a high level of governance is a substitute for an 
expansion of the police force. 
 
3.6 Voter Turnout and Fractionalization 
Social disorganization theories indicate that factors that diminishes the effectiveness of informal 
social controls increase criminal activity (Kelly, 2000). Here we consider two indicators of social 
disorganization – voter turnout in elections, and religious fractionalization. A higher voter 
turnout indicates confidence in the institutions and better social organization. Similarly, a larger 
religious fractionalization would make social organization more difficult. Thus we expect a 
higher level voter turnout, or a lower level of religious fractionalization, and hence less social 
disorganization will result in a police expansion being more effective. Columns 4 and 5 of table 
2 present the results. The interaction between voter turnout and police is negative and significant 
at 1%, while the interaction between religious fractionalization and police is positive and 
significant at 10%. At the sample mean values of the disorganization variables, an increase in the 
police force has a negative effect on the dependent variable -   a 0.027 and 0.030 standard 
deviation reduction in crime losses for voter turnout and religious fractionalization respectively. 
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Both results are significant at 5%. However, results vary when examining the extremes of the 
sample. At both the sample minimum for voter turnout and the maximum value of religious 
fractionalization, police has no significant effect on crime losses. However, the effect of police 
on crime losses increases in magnitude and retains or increases significance using the minimum 
sample value of religious fractionalization or the maximum sample value of voter turnout. The 
magnitude is a 0.053 standard deviation reduction in crime losses for the sample minimum of 
religious fractionalization, and 0.076 standard deviation reduction in crimes losses for the sample 
maximum of voter turnout, both significant at 1%. The turning point where the effect of an 
increase in the police force ceases to be significant is a voter turnout below 0.7, right below the 
mean of the sample, around the 46th percentile. For religious fractionalization the turning point is 
0.43 (62nd percentile), beyond which an increase in the police force has an insignificant effect. 
Both these results are consistent with the theory of social disorganization and crime. 
 
4. Instrumental Variables 
We use two instruments for police strength– a dummy indicating whether the party of the chief 
executive is right-wing or not and the stock of international migrants as a % of the population.  
The right-wing indicator is obtained from the database of political institutions (DPI) and is 
defined as conservative, Christian democratic or right-wing. Right wing governments prefer less 
government intervention and are thus more likely to decrease the police force. Furthermore, it 
has been shown that conservative voters typically perceive immigrants as illegal, and thus a 
larger migrant stock may push conservative governments to spend more on increasing the police 
force (Fennelly and Federico, 2008). Thus we expect that the presence of right wing 
governments is negatively correlated with the size of the police force, while international 
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migration stocks in the country are positively correlated with the size of the police force. 
However, there is no reason to expect a direct effect of the instruments on crime losses.  The first 
stage estimates are presented in column 2 of table 3, with the expected signs for right wing 
governments and migration stocks.  We report the second stage results using instrumental 
variables in table 3, column 1. The coefficient of police per 100,000 of population using 
instrumental variables retains the sign and significance of the base estimations. The magnitude 
increases in absolute terms from -0.0011 in the base estimations to -0.0025 in the estimations 
using the instrumental variables. As indicated in the bottom of table 3, the Sargen-Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions is not rejected for all conventional levels of significance, thus we 
cannot reject the null that all the instruments are valid. We also reject that the estimation is 
underidentified at 5% level of significance.  
 
5. Robustness 
We check for the robustness in terms of model specification. Several studies have shown that 
female population (Di Tella and Schargrodsky), corruption (Gaviria, 2002), fractionalization 
(fajnzylber et al., 2000), trade (Ghosh et al., 2011), and government spending (Naidoo, 2006) are 
factors that influence crime. We add variables that proxy for the aforementioned factors and 
present the results in table A5. We also include firm level variables such as total employees and 
security costs as a % of total sales and check if they affect our main estimation results. As shown 
in table A5, including these sets of variables neither improves the goodness of fit, and thus does 
not improve explanatory power of the model, nor reduce the significance of the variable of 
interest. 
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We also worry that extreme observations in the sample may be driving the results discussed 
above. Thus we omit the top 1%, bottom 1 %, and top and bottom 1% observations of losses due 
to crime as well police size. As indicated in table A6, our main results remain quantitatively 
unchanged from above. 
 
Finally, we worry that our results may be dominated by certain countries. However, we do not 
want to drop too many observations. Thus we drop countries with less than 1,000 observations, 
one at a time, from the sample and see if the coefficient of police is affected. As indicated by 
figure 1, the results are not dominated by any particular country in the sample as we retain the 
sign and significance at 10%. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study adds to the literature by exploring the relationship between police presence and crime 
against firms. The proposed mechanism is that police presence serves to reduce losses firms face 
due to crime. We find a negative relationship between an increase in police size and crime 
against firms. We find that a one standard deviation increase in the police force per 100,000 of 
population decreases losses due to crime by 0.029 standard deviations. We find that this negative 
relationship between police size and crime losses is stronger (more negative) in big cities, 
countries with high voter turnouts, high inequality, and firms that are owned and managed by a 
female than males. 
 
There are several opportunities for future research in the area. Due to data limitations, we are 
unable to explore the quality aspect of police force as a deterrent to crime. It would also be 
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interesting to see how the presence of police affects crime against firms given local conditions. It 
would also be interesting to see if the results in this study hold for panel data that allow for 
filtering out country specific factors from spuriously driving the results.  
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TABLE 1: POLICE AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS (LOSSES DUE TO CRIME/SALES) 
 BASE Police lagged x GDP growth 
Police lagged x 
Gini 
Police lagged x 
Large City or 
Capital 
 1 2 3 4
 
Police per 100,000 persons  
 
-0.0011** -0.0020** 
 
0.0052* 0.0004 
[0.0005] [0.0009]
 
[0.0027] [0.0006]
Police x GDP per Capita Growth 
 
0.0003**  
[0.0001]  
Police x GINI 
 
-0.0002** 
[0.0001] 
Police x Large City or Capital 
 
 
 -0.0022***
 [0.0005]
GDP per Capita Growth 
 
 
-0.0808*** -0.1679*** -0.0706*** -0.0821***
[0.0208] [0.0471] [0.0230] [0.0199]
Firm with Female Owner 
 
 
0.1181* 0.1078* 0.1143* 0.1069*
[0.0632] [0.0630] [0.0616] [0.0622]
Real GNI per capita (in 100s)
 
 
-0.0058*** -0.0061*** -0.0056*** -0.0060***
[0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0011] [0.0010]
GINI  
 
 
-0.0065 -0.0066 0.0455* -0.0069
[0.0113] [0.0114] [0.0258] [0.0101]
Population in Millions, Total 
 
 
0.0034* 0.0025 0.0022 0.0042***
[0.0017] [0.0019] [0.0015] [0.0014]
Small firms 
 
 
0.4023*** 0.3979*** 0.3955*** 0.4040***
[0.0940] [0.0937] [0.0936] [0.0937]
Medium firms 
 
 
0.1664** 0.1654** 0.1592** 0.1631**
[0.0658] [0.0654] [0.0655] [0.0654]
Large City or Capital 
 
 
0.0331 0.0454 0.0398 0.6432***
[0.0953] [0.0944] [0.0982] [0.1681]
Manufacturing 
 
 
-0.2238** -0.2312*** -0.2225** -0.2219**
[0.0813] [0.0815] [0.0822] [0.0827]
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27
Number of Observations 12274 12274 12274 12207
Effect of 1 std dev increase in Police: 
Change in the Standard Deviation of the 
Dependent Variable      
Base -0.029**  
Using Mean -0.033** -0.033*** 
Using Min -0.103** 0.029 
Using Max 0.032 -0.088*** 
Interacted Dummy =0  0.012
Interacted Dummy =1  -0.049***
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets clustered at the country level
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TABLE 2: POLICE AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS (LOSSES DUE TO CRIME/SALES) 
 Police lagged x 
Female Owner & 
Manager  
Police lagged x 
Quality of Gov. 
Police lagged x 
Voter Turnout  
Police lagged x 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
 1 2 3 4
 
Police per 100,000 persons  
 
-0.0008 -0.0060** 0.0065** -0.0019*** 
[0.0005]
 
[0.0026] [0.0025] [0.0004]
Police x firm with female own 
and manager 
 
-0.0028***
[0.0006]
Firm with female owner and 
manager 
 
1.0427***
[0.2078]
Police x Quality of Government  0.0083*
 [0.0043]
 
Quality of Government 
 
 
 -3.4696**
 [1.5425]
Police x Voter Turnout 
 
 -0.0104*** 
 [0.0033] 
 
Voter Turnout 
 
 
 2.5419** 
 [1.0928] 
Police x Religious 
Fractionalization 
 
 0.0025*
 [0.0014]
Religious Fractionalization  
 
 
 -0.6244
 [0.4729]
GDP per Capita Growth 
 
 
-0.0856*** -0.0970*** -0.0829*** -0.0762***
[0.0237] [0.0211] [0.0199] [0.0221]
Firm with Female Owner 
 
 
 0.1202* 0.1168* 0.1180*
 [0.0661] [0.0626] [0.0625]
Real GNI per capita 
 
 
-0.0056*** -0.0041*** -0.0054*** -0.0052***
[0.0011] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0013]
GINI  
 
 
-0.0093 -0.0181 -0.0098 -0.0024
[0.0128] [0.0114] [0.0113] [0.0119]
Population in Millions, Total 
 
 
 
0.0029* 0.0028* 0.0049*** 0.0041**
[0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0015]
Small firms 
 
 
0.3513*** 0.4069*** 0.4033*** 0.4020***
[0.0990] [0.1032] [0.0952] [0.0943]
Medium firms 
 
 
0.1328* 0.1755** 0.1683** 0.1653**
[0.0754] [0.0674] [0.0664] [0.0657]
Large City or Capital 
 
0.0579 0.0354 0.0567 0.0516
[0.0901] [0.1018] [0.0983] [0.0957]
20 
 
 
Manufacturing 
 
 
-0.2275** -0.2251** -0.2172** -0.2224**
[0.0880] [0.0907] [0.0846] [0.0816]
Number of Countries 27 24 27 27
Number of Observations 12449 11242 12274 12274
Effect of 1 std dev increase in 
Police: 
Change in the Standard 
Deviation of the Dependent 
Variable. 
     
Using Mean  -0.043*** -0.027** -0.030***
Using Min  -0.080*** 0.047* -0.053***
Using Max  0.015 -0.076*** -0.005
Interacted Dummy =0 -0.021
Interacted Dummy =1 -0.097***
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TABLE 3: POLICE AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS (LOSSES DUE TO CRIME/SALES)– INSTRUMENTAL 
VARIABLES 
 
% of  Losses Due to 
Crime Over Sales 
IV Estimates 
Second Stage Results 
Police per 100,000 persons
lagged 
 First Stage Results 
 
 1  
 
Police per 100,000 persons lagged 
 
 
-0.0025** 
 
[0.0012]  
Real GDP per Capita Growth 
 
 
-0.0889*** -4.6990
[0.0250] [7.7187]
Right wing government  
 
-107.1931**
[47.0149]
 
International migrant stock (% of population) 
 
8.8599***
[3.2290]
 
Firm with Female Owner 
 
0.1107* -2.7705
[0.0594]
 
[6.5694]
 
Real GNI per capita in 100s 
 
 
-0.0056*** 0.8227
[0.0013] [0.6320]
GINI  
 
 
-0.015 0.1940
[0.0156] [4.3247]
Population in Millions, Total 
 
 
0.0029* -0.4467
[0.0016] [1.1525]
Small firms 
 
 
0.4002*** -1.3706
[0.0928] [2.7090]
Medium firms 
 
 
0.1681*** 0.4318
[0.0643] [2.0697]
Large City or Capital 
 
 
0.0949 34.4200*
[0.1244] [19.8669]
Manufacturing 
 
 
-0.2027** -13.8239***
[0.0853] [4.5140]
Number of Countries 27 27
Number of Observations 12274 12274
Instruments Right wing government, 
International migrant 
stock (% of population) 
 
Under-identification test (Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic) P-
value: 0.0322 
 
Hansen J statistic (over-identification test of all instruments) 
p-value: 0.7219 
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets
clustered at the country level 
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TABLE A1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Losses Due to Crime (% of 
sales) 
Response  to the Question:
“In fiscal year [insert fiscal year], what are the 
estimated losses as a result of theft, robbery, 
vandalism or arson that occurred on 
establishment’s premises calculated as a percent of 
annual sales or the total annual value of the 
losses?” 
For actual values, % of sales was calculated. 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Real GDP per Capita Growth Real GDP per Capita Growth Rate, constant 2000 USD 
Word Development Indicators (WDI), 
World Bank 
Police per 100,000 persons 
lagged 
Police per 100,000 persons lagged. Due to data 
constraints, for some countries the lag is not 
exactly lagged by one year. Specifics of all lag years 
can be found in the appendix. 
United Nations Survey on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems 
Firm with Female Owner Yes Response to Question:"Are any of the owners female?" 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Female Owner and Manager 
Yes Response to Questions:
“Is the Top Manager female?” and "Are any of the 
owners female?" 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Real GNI per capita (in 100s)  GNI per Capita, Constant 2000 USD Word Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank 
GINI Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. 
WDI, World Bank, Development Research 
Group 
Population, Total in millions  Total Population Word Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank 
Small firms Dummy is 1 if firm is small (<20) Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Medium firms Dummy is 1 if firm is medium (20-99) Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Large City or Capital Dummy is 1 if city is either the capital or has more than 250,000 population 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Manufacturing Dummy is 1 for manufacturing firms Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Quality of Government 
 Mean value of the ICRG governance variables 
“Corruption”, “Law and Order”, and 
“Bureaucracy Quality”, scaled 0-1. Higher values 
indicate better quality of government. 1990-2007 
average used. 
International Country Risk Guide – The 
PRS Group 
Voter Turnout 
Turnout in parliamentary elections measured as 
the total number of votes cast divided by the 
number of registered voters. 
IDEA: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm 
 
Years of Schooling 
Average Years of Schooling of Population over 
15. 1990-2007 average used. 1990-2007 average 
used. 
Barro and Lee (2010) 
Corruption 
Corruption Perception Index: 10 point scale 
where higher values indicate less corruption. 1995-
2009 average used. 
Transparency International 
ww.transparency.org 
Religion Fractionalization Probability that two randomly selected people from a given country belong to different religions 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, 
and Wacziarg (2003) 
Employees 
Response to Question:
“At the end of fiscal year [insert last complete 
fiscal year], how many permanent, full-time 
employees did this establishment employ?” 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank 
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Ethnic Fractionalization 
Probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country will not belong to the same 
ethnic group 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, 
and Wacziarg (2003) 
Language Fractionalization 
Probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country do not speak the same 
language 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, 
and Wacziarg (2003) 
Security Costs as a % of sales Enterprise Surveys, World Bank 
Polity 2 
Index of Democracy (Polity 2). Score between -10 
and 10 that indicate how democratic a country. 
Values increase with greater democracy. 1990-
2007 average used. 
 
Polity IV, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/poli
ty4.htm 
 
 
Proportion of Female 
Population Population, female (% of total) 
WDI, World Bank 
Life Expectancy WDI, World Bank 
Tax over GDP  
Government Financial Statistics (GFS), 
International Monetary Fund 
Investment over GDP Total government consumption over GDP Penn World Tables 
Government Consumption 
over GDP Total public and private investment over GDP 
Penn World Tables 
Government Spending on 
Public Order & Safety over 
Total Spending 
Includes spending on police, fire protection 
services, law courts, and prisons 
Government Financial Statistics (GFS), 
International Monetary Fund 
Inflation WDI, World Bank 
Trade  Exports plus imports as a % of GDP WDI, World Bank 
Right Wing Government 
Dummy 
For parties that are defined as conservative, 
Christian democratic, or rightwing Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 
International Migrant Stock as 
% of Population 
International migrant stock is the number of 
people born in a country other than that in which 
they live, including refugees. 
WDI, World Bank 
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TABLE A2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Data Unit 
Losses Due to Crime (% of sales) 0.716 3.942 0.000 100.000 Firm 
GDP per Capita Growth 2.656 4.213 -5.529 10.192 Country
Police per 100,000 persons lagged 287.894 108.187 90.110 480.013 Country
Firm with Female Owner 0.419 0.000 1.000 Firm
Female Owner and Manager 0.152 0.000 1.000 Firm
Real GNI per capita (in 100s) 37.345 31.014 2.257 141.816 Country
GINI 39.826 7.768 25.810 52.330 Country
Population, Total in millions 28.615 27.065 1.353 141.816 Country
Small firms 0.369 0.000 1.000 Firm 
Medium firms 0.378 0.000 1.000 Firm 
Large City or Capital 0.627 0.000 1.000 Firm 
Manufacturing 0.537 0.000 1.000 Firm 
Quality of Government 0.525 0.101 0.351 0.791 Country
Voter Turnout 0.718 0.089 0.460 0.893 Country
Years of Schooling 8.066 1.816 2.850 11.689 Country
Corruption 3.369 0.960 1.982 6.091 Country
Religion Fractionalization 0.335 0.201 0.005 0.685 Country
Employees 121.246 478.223 1.000 20843 Firm
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.383 0.173 0.118 0.663 Country
Language Fractionalization 0.372 0.254 0.030 0.836 Country
Security Costs as a % of sales 1.575 5.798 0.000 384.615 Firm
Polity 2 6.560 4.526 -7.000 10.000 Country
Proportion of Female Population 51.040 1.437 49.165 54.020 Country
Life Expectancy 71.303 3.213 64.123 78.314 Country
Tax over GDP 0.150 0.031 0.089 0.210 Country
Investment over GDP 0.210 0.039 0.150 0.311 Country
Government Consumption over 
GDP 0.081 0.038 0.047 0.213 
Country
Government Spending on Public 
Order & Safety over Total 
Spending 0.061 0.021 0.039 0.116 
Country
Inflation 10.912 8.687 2.358 50.705 Country
Trade over GDP 86.790 35.835 37.354 168.314 Country
Right Wing Government Dummy 0.259 0.000 1.000 Country
International Migrant Stock as % of 
Population 4.733 5.350 0.149 19.631 
Country
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TABLE A3: POLICE, GINI, AND GNI PER CAPITA DATA AND SURVEY YEAR 
Country Survey Year Police per 100,000 persons 
lagged Year 
GINI GNI per Capita
Argentina 2009 2008 2009 2009
Azerbaijan 2008  2006 2008 2008
Belarus 2007  2004 2007 2004
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008  2007 2007 2007
Costa Rica 2009  2006 2009 2009
Czech Republic 2008  2007 1996 2008
Ecuador 2009  2006 2009 2009
El Salvador 2009  2006 2007 2009
Estonia 2008  2007 2004 2008
Fyr Macedonia 2008  2006 2008 2005
Hungary 2008  2007 2007 2008
Kazakhstan 2008  2007 2007 2008
Latvia 2008  2007 2008 2008
Lithuania 2008  2007 2008 2008
Moldova 2008  2007 2008 2008
Mongolia 2008  2004 2008 2000
Nepal 2008  2006 2004 2000
Nicaragua 2009  2006 2005 2009
Paraguay 2009  2006 2008 2009
Peru 2009  2004 2009 2009
Philippines 2008  2007 2006 2008
Poland 2008  2007 2008 2008
Romania 2008  2007 2008 2008
Slovak Republic 2008  2007 1996 2008
Slovenia 2008  2007 2004 2008
Turkey 2007  2006 2008 2007
Ukraine 2007 2006 2008 2007
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TABLE A4: CRIME AND GENDER - COUNTRY AVERAGES 
 
Country % of  Losses Due to Crime Over Sales Police per 100,000 of Population 
Argentina 0.63 206.79 
Azerbaijan 0.20 136.98 
Belarus 0.72 325.46 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.44 157.02 
Costa Rica 0.54 275.27 
Czech Republic 0.48 429.49 
Ecuador 1.11 292.58 
El Salvador 1.73 275.20 
Estonia 1.69 241.87 
Fyr Macedonia 0.50 480.01 
Hungary 0.25 90.11 
Kazakhstan 0.60 449.43 
Latvia 0.42 407.88 
Lithuania 0.43 332.91 
Moldova 0.54 256.50 
Mongolia 0.52 277.27 
Nepal 0.87 201.97 
Nicaragua 1.68 166.81 
Paraguay 1.54 331.48 
Peru 0.64 323.03 
Philippines 1.32 135.16 
Poland 0.45 257.89 
Romania 0.36 235.21 
Slovak Republic 0.64 374.92 
Slovenia 0.26 396.54 
Turkey 0.38 451.86 
Ukraine 0.45 358.16 
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TABLE A5: ROBUSTNESS – ADDED CONTROLS 
 
Coefficient of Police per 100,000 of Population Adjusted R Squared 
 
BASE -0.0011* 
 
0.01 
[0.0005]  
  
Fractionalization 
Ethnic, Language 
-0.0008* 0.01
[0.0004]  
  
Employees and Security 
Total Employees, Security Costs as 
a % of sales 
-0.0012** 0.01
[0.0005]  
  
Corruption and Democracy
Corruption (Transparency 
International), Polity 2 Score 
-0.0011** 0.01
[0.0005]  
  
Female Population 
Proportion of Female Population 
-0.0010* 0.01
[0.0005]  
  
Government Spending and 
Inflation 
Government Spending on Public 
Order & Safety, Government 
Consumption & Investment over 
GDP, Taxes over GDP, Inflation 
-0.0020** 0.01
[0.0009]  
  
Trade 
Trade as a % of GDP 
-0.0009* 0.01
[0.0005]  
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TABLE A6: ROBUSTNESS – EXTREME OBSERVATION DOMINANCE 
 
Coefficient of Police per 100,000 Population 
Dropping Extreme Crime Loss Observations 
Bottom 1% -0.001* 
[0.001]
Top 1% -0.001** 
[0.001]
Top and Bottom 1% -0.001** 
[0.001]
Dropping Extreme Police Observations 
Bottom 1% -0.001* 
[0.001]
Top 1% -0.001** 
[0.000]
Top and Bottom 1% -0.001** 
[0.000]
 
FIGURE 1: COUNTRY DOMINANCE, LESS THAN 1000OBSERVATIONS 
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